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Abstract
Critics of the U.S. proposal to the World Trade Organization (WTO) made in October 2005 are correct when
they argue that adoption of the proposal would significantly reduce available support under the current farm
program structure. Using historical prices and yields from 1980 to 2004, we estimate that loan rates would
have to drop by 9 percent and target prices would have to drop by 10 percent in order to meet the proposed
aggregate Amber Box and Blue Box limits. While this finding should cheer those who think that reform of U.S.
farm programs is long overdue, it alarms those who want to maintain a strong safety net for U.S. agriculture.
The dilemma of needing to reform farm programs while maintaining a strong safety net could be resolved by
redesigning programs so that they target revenue rather than price. Building on a base of 70 percent Green Box
income insurance, a program that provides a crop-specific revenue guarantee equal to 98 percent of the
product of the current effective target price and expected county yield would fit into the proposed aggregate
Amber and Blue Box limits. Payments would be triggered whenever the product of the season-average price
and county average yield fell below this 98 percent revenue guarantee. Adding the proposed crop-specific
constraints lowers the coverage level to 95 percent.
Moving from programs that target price to ones that target revenue would eliminate the rationale for ad hoc
disaster payments. Program payments would automatically arrive whenever significant crop losses or
economic losses caused by low prices occurred. Also, much of the need for the complicated mechanism (the
Standard Reinsurance Agreement) that transfers most risk of the U.S. crop insurance to the federal
government would be eliminated because the federal government would directly assume the risk through farm
programs.
Changing the focus of federal farm programs from price targeting to revenue targeting would not be easy.
Farmers have long relied on price supports and the knowledge that crop losses are often adequately covered by
heavily subsidized crop insurance or by ad hoc disaster payments. Farmers and their leaders would only be
willing to support a change to revenue targeting if they see that the current system is untenable in an era of
tight federal budgets and WTO limits.
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Executive Summary 
Critics of the U.S. proposal to the World Trade Organization (WTO) made in October 
2005 are correct when they argue that adoption of the proposal would significantly reduce 
available support under the current farm program structure. Using historical prices and 
yields from 1980 to 2004, we estimate that loan rates would have to drop by 9 percent and 
target prices would have to drop by 10 percent in order to meet the proposed aggregate 
Amber Box and Blue Box limits. While this finding should cheer those who think that 
reform of U.S. farm programs is long overdue, it alarms those who want to maintain a 
strong safety net for U.S. agriculture. 
The dilemma of needing to reform farm programs while maintaining a strong safety 
net could be resolved by redesigning programs so that they target revenue rather than price. 
Building on a base of 70 percent Green Box income insurance, a program that provides a 
crop-specific revenue guarantee equal to 98 percent of the product of the current effective 
target price and expected county yield would fit into the proposed aggregate Amber and 
Blue Box limits. Payments would be triggered whenever the product of the season-average 
price and county average yield fell below this 98 percent revenue guarantee. Adding the 
proposed crop-specific constraints lowers the coverage level to 95 percent. 
Moving from programs that target price to ones that target revenue would eliminate the 
rationale for ad hoc disaster payments. Program payments would automatically arrive 
whenever significant crop losses or economic losses caused by low prices occurred. Also, 
much of the need for the complicated mechanism (the Standard Reinsurance Agreement) 
that transfers most risk of the U.S. crop insurance to the federal government would be 
eliminated because the federal government would directly assume the risk through farm 
programs.  
Changing the focus of federal farm programs from price targeting to revenue targeting 
would not be easy. Farmers have long relied on price supports and the knowledge that crop 
losses are often adequately covered by heavily subsidized crop insurance or by ad hoc 
disaster payments. Farmers and their leaders would only be willing to support a change to 
revenue targeting if they see that the current system is untenable in an era of tight federal 
budgets and WTO limits.  
 
Keywords:  farm safety net, revenue targeting, U.S. farm programs, WTO. 
  
HOW MUCH “SAFETY” IS AVAILABLE UNDER THE 
U.S. PROPOSAL TO THE WTO? 
In an effort to jump-start the Doha round negotiations in the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO), the United States proposed new limits on trade-distorting domestic 
subsidies. While it remains to be seen whether this proposal will ultimately be successful 
in furthering the negotiations, it has already caused some alarm in the U.S. Congress and 
among farm groups because of the size of the cuts in subsidy levels that would need to 
take place under the proposal. For example, in a public letter to the secretary of 
agriculture, Senator Chambliss, the chair of the Senate Agriculture Committee, requested 
that there be “no net reduction in the agricultural safety net.”1 And the proposal was 
criticized by Larry Mitchell, chief executive of the American Corn Growers Association, 
as “…yet another in a series of policy decisions by the present administration to unravel 
the safety net for the nation’s farm families. The administration’s decision to slash our 
essential domestic farm program benefits by 50 to 60 percent is ill advised, irresponsible 
and ill timed.”2 
These two statements support the notion that the purpose of U.S. farm subsidies is to 
create a safety net for U.S. agriculture. Such a purpose implies that subsidies should 
increase when financial stress increases. But countercyclical aid to farmers is generally 
considered to be trade distorting because it reduces the supply contracting incentives of 
low prices or unsuitable growing conditions. Decoupled support, such as U.S. direct 
payments and E.U. single farm payments, is generally considered to be non-trade 
distorting because it does not change in response to income levels, prices, crop yields, or 
farmers’ planting decisions.  
The dilemma for U.S. trade negotiators is that they need to assure the world that the 
U.S. proposal would result in meaningful reductions in U.S. domestic support while 
simultaneously assuring Congress that the proposal would provide adequate flexibility to 
maintain an adequate agricultural safety net for U.S. farmers. Is it possible to reform U.S. 
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farm programs to make them less trade distorting while simultaneously maintaining 
effective countercyclical “safety net” protection for U.S. farmers? We provide insight 
into this question by estimating the extent of the cuts that will have to be made in current 
program parameters in order to meet the U.S.-proposed limits. We demonstrate that the 
size of the cuts that are required would indeed make the current set of farm programs less 
trade distorting. But the size of the cuts needed would also significantly lower the amount 
of safety provided by the U.S. program. We then estimate the extent to which a redesign 
of U.S. farm programs to maximize countercyclical support could provide an adequate 
safety net. Using prices and detrended yields (not acreage or production) over the period 
from 1980 to 2004, we estimate that a program with the following three components 
would meet the proposed U.S. limits on trade-distorting subsidies with a high degree of 
probability:  
1. Individual farmer crop revenue is guaranteed not to fall below 70 percent of the 
Olympic average of the previous five years of crop revenue. 
2. If the product of national season-average price and county-average yield falls 
below 85 percent of the product of expected county yield and the effective target 
price (as defined in the 2002 U.S. farm bill), then all farmers in a county will 
receive the difference on each planted acre. Such payments are capped at 15 
percent of the product of expected county yield and the effective target price.  
3. If the product of national season-average price and county-average yield falls 
below 95 percent of the product of expected county yield and the effective target 
price, then all farmers in a county will receive the difference on each base acre 
that is assigned to their farm. Such payments are capped at 10 percent of the 
product of expected county yield and the effective target price.  
We report how we derived these estimates in the remainder of the paper.  
 
The U.S. Proposal for Agricultural Domestic Support 
In October 2005, the United States made a proposal for the next WTO agreement on 
agriculture that included significant changes for all three pillars of the agricultural 
negotiations: domestic support, market access, and export competition. The domestic 
support pillar deals with programs in the U.S. farm bill. Under the current WTO 
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agriculture agreement, agricultural support programs are divided into three “boxes”: 
Green, Blue, and Amber. Green Box programs are considered the least trade distorting 
and are not constrained. There is a specific set of guidelines a program must meet in 
order for it to be considered Green Box. Conservation programs are an example of Green 
Box programs. Blue Box programs are thought to be more trade distorting, but 
production limits or fixed payment bases are to be put in place to limit the amount of 
distortion. Currently, Blue Box programs do not face spending limits. The pre-1996 farm 
bill deficiency payment program is an example of a Blue Box program. Amber Box 
programs are thought to be the most trade distorting, and these are the programs that are 
most constrained under the agricultural agreements. Programs that go into the Amber 
Box are subcategorized depending on two factors: the targeting of the program to one or 
many products (product versus non-product specific) and the financial size of the amount 
of support. Once the programs are sorted into the product-specific and non-product-
specific groups, the value of the support is compared to 5 percent of the value of 
agricultural production for the product (in the case of product-specific support) or for all 
agricultural products (in the case of non-product-specific support). If the value of support 
is less (more) than the 5 percent rule, then the support does not (does) count against the 
Amber Box spending limits. This rule is called the de minimis rule, exempting small 
amounts of agricultural support from the Amber Box limits. 
In July 2004, members of the WTO agreed to a framework for the next agricultural 
agreement. The agreement included a cap of 5 percent of the value of agricultural 
production on Blue Box support, a reduction in the de minimis percentage, product-
specific limits on Amber Box support, a reduction in the Amber Box support limit, and a 
reduction of the amount of support from the combination of the Blue and Amber boxes 
and de minimis programs. The U.S. proposal further built upon this agreement in several 
ways. Support limits would be lowered over a five-year period. Blue Box support would 
be capped at 2.5 percent of the value of agricultural production. The Amber Box support 
limit would be cut by 60 percent (from $19.10 billion to $7.64 billion). Product-specific 
caps would be based on 1999-2001 support levels for the product. The de minimis 
percentage would be reduced to 2.5 percent. The total amount of allowable support under 
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the combination of the Blue and Amber boxes and de minimis programs would fall by 53 
percent (Office of the United States Trade Representative). 
Table 1 shows the amounts of product-specific Amber Box support the U.S. reported 
during the 1999-2001 period. Dairy, soybeans, corn, cotton, and sugar had the largest 
amounts of support. Beef and pork had no reported support during the period. If we use 
the average level of support as the product-specific cap (the proposal does not state an 
exact definition of the cap), then the sum of the product-specific caps is $16.13 billion. 
This greatly exceeds the overall Amber Box proposed limit of $7.64 billion, so not all of 
the commodities could be supported to the maximum level at the same time. Thus, it is 
likely that the United States would find that the overall Amber Box limit and some of the 
product-specific limits would be binding under current U.S. farm programs. 
 
Fitting Current Programs into the U.S. Proposal 
Current programs use two different prices to determine if a payment is to be 
received. The countercyclical payment (CCP) program uses the national season-average 
price whereas the marketing loan program uses posted county prices that vary each day. 
The selection of which of these two prices to use will determine the level of protection 
that can be offered to farmers. 
The idea of the marketing loan program is to provide farmers with an absolute 
guarantee that the price they receive for their crop will be no lower than the loan rate in 
their county. The idea is that if the local market price is less than the loan rate on the day 
that a farmer sells a crop, then a payment is made to compensate for the difference. This 
requires that daily prices be calculated. However, many farmers speculate with the 
marketing loan program by taking a loan deficiency payment (LDP) when they estimate 
that the gap between the loan rate and local market prices is widest: that is, when market 
prices are at their low point after harvest. This typically occurs for most regions right 
after harvest. 
To illustrate why the choice of price matters, we calculated the average price gap 
between the season-average farm price and the price indicated by average LDP rates 
historically when average LDP rates are positive. The season-average farm price is the 
average price received by farmers. Positive LDP rates indicate prices are below the loan  
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TABLE 1. Reported Amber Box support by product, 1999-2001 
Product 1999 2000 2001 Average 
 ($ Million) 
Dairy 4,660 5,070 4,483 4,738 
Soybeans 2,856 3,606 3,610 3,358 
Corn 2,554 2,757 1,270 2,193 
Cotton 2,353 1,050 2,810 2,071 
Sugar 1,207 1,177 1,061 1,149 
Wheat 974 847 189 670 
Rice 435 624 763 607 
Tobacco 924 519 -1 481 
Peanuts 349 438 305 364 
Sunflower 143 161 55 120 
Apples 99 175 0 91 
Sorghum 154 84 6 81 
Canola 39 82 23 48 
Barley 40 70 16 42 
Oats 31 45 4 26 
Flaxseed 11 25 12 16 
Sheep and Lamb 13 10 22 15 
Wool 9 33 0 14 
Potatoes 14 26 0 13 
Honey 0 29 0 10 
Cranberries 20 0 0 7 
Onions 0 10 0 3 
Tomatoes 0 7 0 2 
Peaches 0 7 0 2 
Safflower 2 3 0 2 
Mohair 2 2 0 1 
Crambe 1 2 0 1 
Pears 0 3 0 1 
Apricots 0 2 0 1 
Mustard Seed 1 0 0 0 
Rapeseed 0 0 0 0 
Sesame 0 0 0 0 
Beef and Veal 0 0 0 0 
Hogs and Pigs 0 0 0 0 
Rye 0 0 0 0 
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rate at some point during the crop year, and this can occur even when the season-average 
price is above the loan rate. Given average LDP rates for each year, we can back out a 
national price representing the average price when LDPs are taken. This is equal to the 
national loan rate less the average LDP rate. Comparing these prices to the season-
average prices for each year, we compute the price difference between the two and 
average this difference across all years. Table 2 shows the calculation of the corn LDP 
price gap. We subtract this price gap from the 2005 projected prices to calculate projected 
prices for LDP utilization. We then subtract these projected prices from the national crop 
loan rates to determine 2005 projected average LDP rates. Projected LDP expenditures 
are equal to projected production times the projected average LDP rate.  
Table 3 shows the calculated LDP price gap by crop. For rice and cotton, the price 
gap is calculated from the U.S. season-average prices and not the adjusted world prices 
actually used in the marketing loan program. As shown, all farmers have used the LDP 
price gap to their advantage. The typical farmer takes an LDP just after harvest and then 
successfully markets his crop at a significantly higher price later in the year. The LDP 
program therefore overcompensates farmers in most low-price years in that, on average, 
farmers market their crop for a price greater than the guaranteed price, which is the 
county loan rate. This suggests that use of the season average price would provide more 
targeted countercyclical support, and because it would lower program costs, use of the 
season-average price would allow target revenues to be higher than they would be if the 
posted county price were used. 
 
TABLE 2. Corn LDP price gap calculation 
Year 
Season-Average 
Price 
National Loan 
Rate 
Average LDP 
Rate 
LDP Price 
Gap 
 ($ per bushel) 
1998 1.94 1.89 0.14 0.19 
1999 1.82 1.89 0.26 0.19 
2000 1.85 1.89 0.26 0.22 
2001 1.97 1.89 0.12 0.20 
2002 2.32 1.98 0.00 0.34 
2003 2.42 1.98 0.01 0.45 
2004 1.95 1.95 0.24 0.24 
Average    0.26 
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TABLE 3. LDP price gap by commodity 
Crop LDP Price Gap 
 ($ per bushel) 
Barley* 0.78 
Corn 0.26 
Oats 0.23 
Sorghum 0.22 
Soybeans 0.56 
Wheat 0.48 
 ($ per pound) 
Cotton 0.0757 
Peanuts 0.0182 
 ($ per hundredweight) 
Rice 2.01 
*Price gap calculated from the “all-barley” price. 
 
To see how the policy prices under the current programs would have to be changed 
to fit the U.S. proposed WTO limits, we computed what CCP and LDP expenditures 
would have been over the 1980 to 2004 period had the two programs been in place. This 
historical analysis will give us a general idea about the magnitude of the changes that 
would be required to meet the proposed limits. Finer detail would require a forward-
looking analysis. For the computation, we used the actual prices during the period, but we 
updated acreage to 2004 levels and yields as shown in the equation below. 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
t
t
t YieldTrend
YieldActual
*YieldTrendYieldAdjusted 2004  
where t is the crop year. 
To compute the WTO limits, we assumed a total value of U.S. agricultural 
production of $230 billion. This results in a Blue Box cap of $5.75 billion. Given this and 
the Amber Box limit of $7.64 billion, we allocated $750 million of Blue Box support and 
$1.04 billion in Amber Box support to commodities not covered by our analysis (mainly 
dairy and sugar), leaving $5 billion in Blue Box support and $6.6 billion in Amber Box 
support for the nine commodities examined here. 
We then computed the loan rates and target prices that would have resulted in support 
exceeding the new WTO support limits 4 percent of the time (1 year out of the 25 years 
examined). The 4 percent target was chosen to reflect a couple of points. First, any 
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countercyclical program has a stochastic payout stream that will rise and fall over time. 
Thus, such a program could exceed any given bound if left unchecked. Second, the United 
States has shown a willingness to live with the possibility of exceeding WTO support limits 
(see the FAPRI 2002 U.S. Baseline Briefing Book discussion on WTO issues).  
To begin, we assumed that all commodities would face the same proportional 
reductions in the loan rate and target price to reach the limits of $6.6 billion for Amber 
Box support and $5 billion for Blue Box support for the commodities covered. Given the 
price and yield pattern seen from 1980 to 2004, a 9 percent reduction in loan rates is 
needed to reduce marketing loan support to the U.S. proposed Amber Box limit. Table 4 
shows the adjusted loan rates. Table 5 shows the estimated historical Amber Box support 
at the adjusted loan rates. The 1986 crop year was the one year in which the limit was 
exceeded (by a large margin). We estimate that $10.26 billion would have flowed out 
through the marketing loan program, with corn receiving the lion’s share at $6.45 billion. 
Corn’s season-average price for 1986 was $1.50 per bushel, well below even the lowered 
loan rate of $1.77. Two other years nearly hit the limit. The 1999 and 2001 crop years 
also exhibited low commodity prices and high marketing loan support. Corn would have 
received the most support in 1999; cotton and soybeans would have received the most 
support in 2001. 
To meet the $5 billion Blue Box limit, given the reduced loan rates and the current 
direct payment rates, target prices would need to be reduced by 10 percent.  
 
TABLE 4. Impact of U.S. WTO proposal on commodity loan rates 
Crop Units 
Current  
Loan Rate 
Adjusted  
Loan Rate 
Barley ($/bushel) 1.85 1.68 
Corn ($/bushel) 1.95 1.77 
Cotton ($/pound) 0.5200 0.4732 
Oats ($/bushel) 1.33 1.21 
Peanuts ($/pound) 0.1775 0.1615 
Rice ($/hundredweight) 6.50 5.92 
Sorghum ($/bushel) 1.95 1.77 
Soybeans ($/bushel) 5.00 4.55 
Wheat ($/bushel) 2.75 2.50 
 TABLE 5. Estimated historical Amber Box support at adjusted loan rates 
Year Wheat Oats Rice Cotton Corn Sorghum Peanut Soybean Barley Total 
 ($ million) 
1980 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1981 0 0 0 75 0 0 0 0 0 75 
1982 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 33 36 
1983 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1984 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 18 
1985 0 44 304 0 0 29 0 180 47 603 
1986 1,195 46 949 259 6,445 302 0 975 89 10,261 
1987 950 0 144 0 1,119 144 0 0 69 2,427 
1988 0 0 241 0 0 0 0 0 0 241 
1989 0 0 127 0 0 0 0 0 4 131 
1990 856 58 256 0 0 0 0 0 33 1,203 
1991 0 41 74 0 0 0 0 0 39 153 
1992 0 26 437 108 0 49 0 0 47 667 
1993 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 52 68 
1994 0 42 252 0 0 0 0 0 45 339 
1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1996 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 8 
1998 800 68 0 0 1,039 154 0 524 51 2,636 
1999 1,183 61 395 756 2,301 205 0 1,298 33 6,232 
2000 814 66 477 377 2,012 42 0 1,579 36 5,403 
2001 440 0 806 2,092 696 23 0 2,088 23 6,169 
2002 0 0 737 854 0 0 0 0 0 1,591 
2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2004 0 8 115 925 1,016 132 0 30 0 2,226 
           
Limit 670 27 607 2,071 2,194 81 364 3,358 42 6,600 
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Table 6 shows the current and adjusted target prices. Table 7 shows the resulting 
estimated historical CCP expenditures by commodity and in total for the 1980-2004 
period. The 1999 crop year was the year that exceeded the Blue Box limit. Seven of the 
nine crops had season-average prices low enough to trigger CCP payments. The 1986 and 
2000 crop years also approached the $5 billion limit, with seven of the nine crops 
receiving CCP payments. 
So given proportional cuts of 10 percent in the target prices and 9 percent in the loan 
rates, the United States could meet, with a high degree of confidence, the proposed limits 
in Amber Box and Blue Box support. However, the proposal also includes product-
specific limits on Amber Box support as well. If we compare the product-specific limits 
outlined in Table 1 to the commodity-specific support estimated in Table 5, we see that 
while the overall Amber Box limit was met, the product-specific limits were not met in 
several cases. We returned to the historical analysis and calculated the loan rates required 
to meet the product-specific limits. For cotton, peanuts, and soybeans, no reduction in 
loan rates is needed. For corn, a 10 percent reduction in the loan rate is needed to reduce 
marketing loan support to meet the limit. For the other crops, the loan rate reduction 
needed is on the order of 17 to 25 percent. These results also show that the United States 
could be bound by both the overall limits and the product-specific limits and that 
proportional reductions may not work. 
 
TABLE 6. Impact of U.S. WTO proposal on commodity target prices 
Crop Units 
Current Target 
Price 
Adjusted  
Target Price 
Barley ($/bushel) 2.24 2.02 
Corn ($/bushel) 2.63 2.37 
Cotton ($/pound) 0.7240 0.6516 
Oats ($/bushel) 1.44 1.30 
Peanuts ($/pound) 0.2475 0.2228 
Rice ($/hundredweight) 10.50 9.45 
Sorghum ($/bushel) 2.57 2.31 
Soybeans ($/bushel) 5.80 5.22 
Wheat ($/bushel) 3.92 3.53 
 TABLE 7. Estimated historical Blue Box support at adjusted target prices and loan rates 
Year Wheat Oats Rice Cotton Corn Sorghum Peanut Soybean Barley Total 
 ($ million) 
1980 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1981 0 0 0 449 0 0 0 0 0 449 
1982 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1983 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1984 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1985 0 6 111 169 0 18 0 0 0 304 
1986 1,172 8 231 699 2,639 111 0 0 33 4,894 
1987 1,015 0 0 0 1,242 111 0 0 0 2,368 
1988 0 0 53 289 0 0 0 0 0 342 
1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1990 922 8 78 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,009 
1991 19 8 0 169 0 0 0 0 0 196 
1992 0 0 231 479 144 41 0 0 0 895 
1993 0 0 0 39 0 0 0 0 0 39 
1994 0 7 62 0 0 0 0 0 0 69 
1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1996 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1998 830 8 0 0 1,242 111 0 0 0 2,191 
1999 1,172 8 228 1,117 2,255 111 0 230 0 5,121 
2000 899 8 231 869 2,002 45 0 352 0 4,406 
2001 528 0 231 1,117 988 15 0 352 0 3,232 
2002 0 0 231 1,117 0 0 85 0 0 1,433 
2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 44 0 0 44 
2004 0 0 0 1,117 1,157 111 33 0 0 2,418 
           
Limit          5,000 
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Reductions of this magnitude would be seen by many agricultural groups as creating 
a sizable hole in the U.S. agricultural safety net. Whereas the combination of the CCP 
and marketing loan protected producers against corn prices below $2.35, soybean prices 
below $5.36, and wheat prices below $3.40, the new levels would be $2.09, $4.78, and 
$3.01, respectively. Also, the CCP and marketing loan programs do not respond to yield 
disasters. As Table 8 illustrates, in the drought years of 1983 and 1988 and the flood year 
of 1993 very little support would have been given to U.S. agriculture under these 
programs, while in the bumper crop year of 2004 significant payments were given. 
 
TABLE 8. Estimated historical combined support 
Year LDP CCP Total 
 ($ million) 
1980 0 0 0 
1981 75 449 524 
1982 36 0 36 
1983 0 0 0 
1984 18 0 18 
1985 603 304 907 
1986 10,261 4,894 15,155 
1987 2,427 2,368 4,794 
1988 241 342 582 
1989 131 0 131 
1990 1,203 1,009 2,212 
1991 153 196 349 
1992 667 895 1,562 
1993 68 39 107 
1994 339 69 408 
1995 0 0 0 
1996 0 0 0 
1997 8 0 8 
1998 2,636 2,191 4,827 
1999 6,232 5,121 11,353 
2000 5,403 4,406 9,809 
2001 6,169 3,232 9,401 
2002 1,591 1,433 3,024 
2003 0 44 44 
2004 2,226 2,418 4,643 
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Redesign of U.S. Farm Policy 
The motivation for our proposed redesign of U.S. farm policy is illustrated nicely in 
Figure 1. Average per-acre market revenue for Iowa corn farmers from 1980 to 2004 
peaked in 1995, hit a minimum in 1993, and from 1998 to 2001 hovered around $250 per 
acre. Had the current CCP and LDP programs been in place over this period, $100 per-
acre payments would have occurred during the period from 1998 to 2001, and they did 
occur during 2004 and 2005. No payments would have occurred during 1993. Peak after-
payment revenue occurred in 2004 (with 2005 close behind). Note that 2004 market 
revenue was about the same as market revenue in 1997, but Iowa farmers received no 
payments in 1997. 
The explanation for the mismatch between farm revenue and payments is that the 
current set of U.S. programs targets low prices rather than low revenue. In 2004, low 
prices triggered large payments even though per-acre income levels appear adequate. 
This illustrates that low prices are not synonymous with financial stress because high 
yields can bolster farm income. Similarly, high corn prices in 1993 clearly were not an 
indicator of financial health because Iowa corn farmers had only half a crop to sell. 
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FIGURE 1. Average Iowa corn revenue with and without current subsidies 
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Redirecting U.S. farm programs toward hitting a revenue target rather than a price 
target could reduce aggregate expenditures while simultaneously reducing the years in 
which farm income fell to unacceptable levels, as occurred in Iowa in 1993. The cost 
savings accrue from two sources. First, overcompensation would be reduced in high-
yield, low-price years by accounting for the fact that farmers have more production to sell 
in these years. Second, although payments from a revenue-targeting program would be 
greater when yields are low—such as occurred in 1993 in Iowa—the probability that low 
yields would trigger payments to all states and regions is close to zero because crop 
yields are not perfectly correlated across the country. For example, 1993 corn yields in 
Illinois did not suffer as they did in Iowa.  
The foregoing discussion suggests that moving U.S. farm programs to a counter-
cyclical program that targets revenue instead of price could reduce aggregate 
expenditures while simultaneously improving the farm safety net. If this combination is 
possible, then this is exactly what is needed to assuage concerns that the U.S. proposal 
would “unravel” U.S. farm support. 
Key Design Aspects 
Moving to a program that targets revenue instead of price is just the first step in 
designing a new farm program. The extent to which such a program would actually 
improve the safety net while reducing expenditures depends on three program attributes: 
(1) individual versus area guarantees; (2) if an area guarantee is chosen, which area yield 
to use; and (3) the choice of which price to use. 
Individual vs. Area Guarantee. What features would be embodied in an effective 
safety net program? Farmers’ preferences are simple: they prefer higher average 
payments, and if farmers value payments more when their income is low, then they 
would prefer that the payments arrive when their income is low. Expressed in the context 
of a farm program, these preferences mean that farmers would prefer a countercyclical 
program that makes large average payments. Furthermore, they would prefer that 
payments would arrive when their individual income was low. Abstracting from 
production costs, income is low when market revenue is low, which implies that farmers 
prefer revenue insurance plans such as Revenue Assurance, Income Protection, and Crop 
Revenue Coverage. Part of the preference for revenue insurance plans comes from the 
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preferences of bankers who loan farmers money. Bankers often use the revenue insurance 
policy as a guarantee for their production loan. 
The downside of providing farmers with high revenue guarantees at the individual 
farm level is that these guarantees would induce farmers to change their planting, crop 
management, and marketing decisions in response to the incentives in the program. That 
is, high government guarantees at the individual farm level would induce farmers to farm 
the program rather than make decisions based on market considerations. Such moral 
hazard considerations are why the U.S. crop insurance program limits the individual 
guarantees that are available to 85 percent of expected revenue. 
One approach that has been taken to reduce moral hazard problems of high 
coverage levels is to make payments when an indicator of farm income is low rather 
that when actual farm income is low. For example, Group Risk Income Protection 
(GRIP) in the U.S. crop insurance program makes indemnity payments when the 
average county revenue is less than a county revenue guarantee. Basing payments on 
area revenue rather than individual revenue will decrease moral hazard because farmers 
can influence the size of the payments only through their acreage decisions. Thus 
farmers will look to market signals when deciding on how to care for, harvest, and 
market their crops.   
Further decoupling of payments from production decisions can be accomplished by 
making payments on fixed base acres, much like what is done with the U.S. CCP program. 
The trade-off of moving to more decoupled countercyclical payments is more market 
orientation, resulting in a decrease in moral hazard but less individual income protection. 
Which Area Yield to Use? If moral hazard concerns lead us away from individual 
farm guarantees, then we must choose which area yield to use. GRIP uses the county 
yield. Former Congressman Stenholm’s SIPP (Supplemental Income Protection Program) 
proposal used national yields. Other natural alternatives are state yields and crop 
reporting district yields.  
There are three considerations in this choice. The first is the degree of correlation 
between farm yields and the chosen area yields. A higher correlation implies a better 
safety net because payments will arrive more often when income is low. This 
consideration argues for a low level of aggregation, such as at the county level.  
16 / Babcock and Hart  
The second consideration is cost. The greater is the variability in yield, the higher 
will be the expected cost of the program. Variability of yield decreases as the level of 
aggregation increases. This consideration argues for a high level of aggregation, such as 
national or state yields. 
The final consideration is the degree of spatial correlation between yields. Lower 
spatial correlation implies lower year-to-year variability in total program payments. Low 
temporal variability allows more safety to be built into a program that must meet a limit 
on yearly expenditures. To see why low variability helps, consider the following 
situation. Suppose the United States has agreed to limit payments to $5 billion per year 
and Congress is considering two program options. One option is projected to pay out the 
maximum of $5 billion with a probability of 20 percent, $1 billion with a probability of 
20 percent, and nothing with a probability of 60 percent. The expected payout from this 
option is $1.2 billion. The other option pays out $4 billion with a probability of 20 
percent, $2 billion with a probability of 20 percent, and nothing with a probability of 60 
percent. The expected payout under this option is also $1.2 billion. Under the first 
program option there is no room for any increase in support because the $5 billion limit 
would be exceeded. However, the second option still has room for additional support 
because the maximum payout is still less than the limit. 
This simple example illustrates that programs that have lower variability in year-to-
year payments can offer more average support than programs that have higher variability. 
By their very nature countercyclical programs must vary payments to individuals; 
otherwise, they would be fixed payments. But different countercyclical programs will 
differ in the variability of total payments made to all individuals. For example, compare 
the variability of aggregate payments in a safety net program that pays corn farmers when 
the corn price falls below a certain amount to a program that pays farmers when their 
yield falls below a certain amount. When price falls below the target price, every eligible 
farmer in the United States would receive a payment because for most commodities 
market prices are about the same across the country. Under the yield safety net program, 
only a portion of farmers would receive payments in a year because growing conditions 
are not perfectly correlated across the country. In other words, price risk is more systemic 
than yield risk.  
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Taking this example one step further, if there is a limit on aggregate payments, then 
the amount of protection that can be offered to each farmer under a program that protects 
against yield shortfalls will be much higher than a program that offers protection against 
price shortfalls. A program that protects revenue can offer an intermediate level of 
protection because revenue risk is more systemic than yield risk but less systemic than 
price risk. Furthermore, a revenue countercyclical program that pays off when national 
revenue is low will have greater variability than a program that pays off when individual 
farm revenue is low. Thus, this consideration argues for a low level of aggregation, such 
as at the county level. 
Which Price to Use? There are two choices concerning prices that need to be made. 
The first concerns what price to use to set the target revenue level. The second concerns 
what price to use to determine whether a payment should be made.  
Our current price support programs pay farmers if market price falls below a price 
trigger, the level of which is set by Congress in farm legislation. CCP payments flow 
when the season-average price falls below the fixed effective target price and marketing 
loan payments flow when the posted county price falls below the fixed loan rate. The 
advantage of this approach is that farmers are assured (barring subsequent congressional 
action) of a certain level of support for the life of the legislation. One disadvantage is that 
as the expected market price drops for a particular crop, farmers have no incentive to 
respond to the low price by cutting production. Thus, fixed support prices tend to 
perpetuate periods of low market prices.  
A market-based alternative would be to use futures prices to estimate expected price 
and then base the target revenue on this expected price. Thus, in low-price years, farmers 
would have more of an incentive to cut production. And in high-price years, farmers 
would have additional incentive to expand production. Crop revenue insurance plans 
provide market-based guarantees. For example, GRIP calculates expected revenue as the 
product of the average futures price over a period of days and expected county yields. 
The reason for using a market-based price to determine the guarantee is that crop 
insurance companies do not want to be in a position of having to offer a guarantee that is 
well above what markets project a crop is worth.  
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Program Details 
The U.S. proposal anticipates that U.S. farm countercyclical support programs would 
fall into both the Amber Box and the Blue Box, with the current CCP program falling 
into the Blue Box and the marketing loan program falling into the Amber Box. Thus, we 
need to allocate new countercyclical revenue payments into both the Amber and Blue 
boxes in order to maximize the amount of support in the new safety net. However, before 
we turn to the details of new Amber and Blue box programs, we will present the base 
countercyclical revenue program that will not count against either Amber Box or Blue 
Box limits because it will fall into the Green Box. 
Green Box Program Countercyclical Support. Section 7 of Annex 2 of the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture spells out the criteria that an income insurance program 
must adhere to if it is to be considered as Green Box support: 
(a) Eligibility for such payments shall be determined by an income loss, 
taking into account only income derived from agriculture, which exceeds 
30 percent of average gross income or the equivalent in net income terms 
(excluding any payments from the same or similar schemes) in the preced-
ing three-year period or a three-year average based on the preceding five-
year period, excluding the highest and the lowest entry. Any producer 
meeting this condition shall be eligible to receive the payments. 
 
(b) The amount of such payments shall compensate for less than 70 
percent of the producer’s income loss in the year the producer becomes 
eligible to receive this assistance. 
 
(c) The amount of any such payments shall relate solely to income; it shall 
not relate to the type or volume of production (including livestock units) 
undertaken by the producer; or to the prices, domestic or international, 
applying to such production; or to the factors of production employed. 
 
There is a bit of a contradiction in these statements in that payments can be made 
when farm income is low, but farm income is determined by the output price and 
production levels. That is, an income loss can only occur if either prices or production 
drop. Yet paragraph (c) indicates that the size of payments cannot depend on either 
production levels or prices.  
For our purposes here, we will focus attention on paragraphs (a) and (b), which 
imply that a guarantee that equals 70 percent of the Olympic average of the previous five 
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years of revenue can be considered as Green Box support. Hence, it will not count toward 
the limits in the Amber and Blue boxes. We also assume that such payments can be made 
on a crop-specific basis, if for no other reason than a farmer with a single crop would 
qualify for this type of payment. Another interpretation is that only whole-farm Green 
Box income insurance programs would be allowed, which would be similar to the 
Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR) insurance offered in the U.S. crop insurance program. 
What this implies is that a base level of countercyclical revenue support can be given 
to U.S. farmers in the form of a 70 percent revenue guarantee. As shown in Figure 2, 70 
percent revenue coverage is the most popular level of coverage for farmers who buy 
Revenue Assurance. Ironically, the Unites States reports all crop insurance subsidies as 
Amber Box support. Adopting a Green Box program at a 70 percent coverage level 
would thereby move a significant amount of Amber Box support over to the Green Box. 
A New Amber Box Program. The next revenue countercyclical program to be 
developed will build on the Green Box 70 percent base and will be designed to fit into the 
Amber Box. Amber Box spending is generally tied to production or price levels and is 
considered to be the most trade distorting. As discussed in the previous section, offering 
individual farm guarantees at high coverage levels will begin to affect farmers’ planting  
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FIGURE 2. Revenue Assurance insured acreage in 2005  
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and crop management decisions. Given the 30 percent deductible built into the Green 
Box program, such distortions are likely minimal. But at higher coverage levels, such 
distortions will likely begin to come into play. 
As discussed, a partial decoupling of support from management decisions can be 
made by basing the next level of countercyclical support on area yields. Given that our 
objective is to design an effective farm-level safety net, and given the limited amount of 
spatial poolability from national or state yields, we choose to use county yields. 
Payments will be made whenever actual county revenue falls below the Amber Box 
trigger revenue level for each crop. To reduce the amount of change that would have to 
take place relative to current farm program structures, we propose to use fixed target 
prices to determine the trigger revenue levels rather than expected market prices. For lack 
of a better alternative, we will use the effective target prices that are in place for the 2005 
crop year. Table 9 presents the levels. To maximize the amount of coverage that this 
program will provide, we calculate actual county revenue as the product of the season 
average price and county average yield. 
The trigger revenue level will equal some percentage of the product of expected 
county yield (the same yield used to determine trigger yield and revenue levels in Group 
Risk Plan and GRIP) and the effective target price. The optimization problem is to 
maximize the percentage—the “Amber Box coverage level”—such that the probability of 
total payments across all crops being greater than Amber Box limits does not exceed a 
certain level. Because this is a program designed to be designated as Amber Box, 
payments will be based on actual planted acreage. 
  
TABLE 9. Effective target prices for 2005 crop year 
Crop Units Effective Target Price 
Wheat ($/bushel) 3.40 
Soybeans ($/bushel) 5.36 
Peanuts ($/pound) 0.2295 
Cotton ($/pound) 0.6573 
Sorghum ($/bushel) 2.22 
Corn ($/bushel) 2.35 
Oats ($/bushel) 1.416 
Rice ($/hundredweight) 8.15 
Barley ($/bushel) 2.00 
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A per-acre payment for a particular crop is given by the following formula: 
Amber Payment = min(max(0, α*ETP*E[Yc] − SAP* Yc), (α − 0.70)*ETP*E[Yc]) 
where α > 0.70 is the Amber Box coverage level, ETP is the effective target price for a 
crop, E[Yc] is the expected county yield, SAP is the season average price, and Yc is the 
actual county yield. The minimum operation takes place to reflect the 70 percent 
coverage offered by the Green Box program. 
A New Blue Box Program. Additional countercyclical revenue support can be 
provided with a program that can fit into the proposed Blue Box. Blue Box programs can 
base payments on actual prices and production levels if they are paid on a fixed acreage 
base. Therefore, our Blue Box program is similar to our Amber Box program except it 
will be paid on a fixed acreage base. In addition, it will build support on top of the Amber 
Box support so that the per-base-acre payment formula is Blue Payment =  
min(max(0, β*ETP*E[Yc] − SAP* Yc), (β − α)*ETP*E[Yc]) where β is the Blue Box 
coverage level. 
To summarize, countercyclical support for farm income can most effectively be 
achieved by making payments when farm revenue is low. To determine the degree to 
which an agricultural safety net can be maintained given the limits on support proposed 
by the United States, we have designed a sequence of three tiered countercyclical 
programs. The base program provides individual farmers with a revenue guarantee equal 
to 70 percent of the Olympic average of the past five years of their revenue. Payments 
under this program would be declared as Green Box support. The second-tier program 
would provide support from 70 percent to 100*α percent of the product of the effective 
target price and expected county yield. This support would be paid on planted acreage so 
it would fall into the Amber Box. The third-tier program would provide support from 
100*α percent to 100*β percent. Payments under this third-tier program would be based 
on base acres so this support could be declared as Blue Box. 
Solving for α and β   
To determine the settings for α and β, we again utilize an historical analysis. Using 
the same 1980-2004 period that we used to estimate payments under the current program 
tools, we estimate payments under the revenue Amber Box and Blue Box programs. As 
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with the earlier analysis, this historical analysis will give us a general idea about the 
magnitude of the changes that would be required to meet the proposed limits. Finer detail 
would require a forward-looking analysis. For the Amber Box program we used 2004 
planted acreage and detrended (to 2004) yields. For the Blue Box program we set the 
base acreage equal to 2004 planted acreage for each of the crops, as this program would 
be a new program and not necessarily tied to the current base acreage structure. The yield 
and acreage data is at the county level. 
To start, suppose that we did not have to split the new safety net program into 
separate Amber and Blue boxes, and suppose that there were no product-specific limits. 
How high a coverage level (α) could we obtain and still meet the combined limit of the 
Amber and Blue boxes (support at or below $11.6 billion)? We estimate that a coverage 
level of 99 percent can be achieved while still meeting the combined limit in 24 out of the 
25 years. That is, ignoring the Amber versus Blue Box split, as well as the product-
specific limits, 99 percent of the current effective target price could be protected by a 
county revenue program while still meeting overall WTO limits as proposed by the 
United States. If we allocate coverage to meet both aggregate Amber and Blue Box 
limits, the top coverage level is 98 percent. These results suggest that moving to a 
program that targets revenue can provide a much higher amount of safety than does a 
program that targets price. 
Table 10 shows the outlays from such a 99 percent program. The 1986 crop year is 
the one year that exceeds the limit. Payments approached the limit for the 1999 and 2000 
crop years. We can clearly see how targeting revenue creates a much different pattern of 
payments than the pattern that occurs when price is targeted. The revenue program would 
have provided significant payments in the drought year of 1988 and the flood year of 
1993 whereas the current array of programs would not (compare Table 10 to Table 8). 
However, if we examine the product-specific limit, there would be several instances 
in which the support from a 99 percent program would exceed the allowed level. To find 
the parameters that allow the proposed revenue programs to fit all of the requirements 
(the overall limit, the Amber and Blue Box limits, and the product-specific limits), we 
estimated α and β such that any of the three limits is only exceeded once out of the 25 
years in the historical analysis (a 4 percent chance). Because the Blue Box revenue 
 TABLE 10. Revenue support available at a 99 percent county revenue guarantee  
Year Wheat Oats Rice Cotton Corn Sorghum Peanut Soybean Barley Total 
 ($ million) 
1980 311 20 0 805 622 71 100 148 21 2,099 
1981 353 1 1 830 132 20 0 113 1 1,451 
1982 286 7 113 537 55 6 0 130 1 1,135 
1983 77 3 45 701 1,075 78 16 199 1 2,196 
1984 237 7 54 466 206 92 1 920 17 2,000 
1985 784 21 252 496 355 74 9 591 55 2,635 
1986 1,995 29 511 1,256 6,724 234 12 1,046 82 11,890 
1987 1,438 4 99 116 2,194 109 2 109 41 4,113 
1988 648 21 229 700 4,507 48 1 638 71 6,864 
1989 865 29 69 447 1,070 158 6 634 31 3,310 
1990 1,336 45 302 261 833 91 22 244 14 3,148 
1991 1,269 51 77 607 2,237 89 5 575 11 4,922 
1992 651 12 435 748 1,739 59 2 376 18 4,038 
1993 664 28 119 910 3,657 42 33 829 14 6,296 
1994 463 38 243 63 225 27 2 32 15 1,107 
1995 253 8 2 467 50 9 8 118 0 914 
1996 369 5 0 151 182 36 3 11 1 758 
1997 444 5 1 223 667 15 1 20 5 1,381 
1998 1,092 47 33 850 3,737 149 1 958 12 6,879 
1999 1,468 49 511 1,651 5,367 157 14 2,201 13 11,431 
2000 1,442 47 519 1,517 4,970 173 51 2,178 13 10,908 
2001 1,273 10 522 1,728 3,911 128 4 2,388 15 9,979 
2002 852 16 522 1,616 2,405 172 186 937 10 6,716 
2003 289 11 30 473 601 153 63 326 5 1,950 
2004 376 15 89 908 1,924 143 70 596 1 4,121 
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program is conditioned on both α and β, while the Amber Box revenue program depends 
only on α, we computed the setting for α and the Amber Box expenditures first. That is, 
we solved for the α such that both the product-specific limits and the Amber Box support 
limit of $6.6 billion was met for the nine commodities. As we did in the analysis of the 
current programs, we assumed that all of the commodities had the same parameter setting 
(the same α). Table 11 shows the historical results for the Amber Box revenue program 
for α = 0.85, the highest value that satisfies all of the constraints. For the Amber Box 
revenue program, the binding constraints were the product-specific limits for wheat, corn, 
and sorghum. If we ignored the product-specific caps in the U.S. proposal, then an α of 
0.89 was possible. Thus, some of the product-specific limits were more binding than the 
overall limit. 
One major difference between the Amber Box revenue program and the marketing 
loan program is the year-to-year variability flow of payments. From Table 8, we can see 
that in five years (20 percent of the time) no payments would be made under the 
marketing loan program. The Amber Box revenue program would make payments every 
year. Thus, while both programs are constructed to the Amber Box constraints, the 
Amber Box revenue program provides a much steadier flow of payments over the years 
examined. The reason, of course, is that when revenue is targeted, payments will flow to 
farmers in counties that experience poor yields, whereas the current programs pay out 
only when price is low. 
Given an α of 0.85 and the $5 billion constraint on Blue Box support, we then 
estimated β, again assuming all crops receive the same β. Table 12 contains the estimated 
historical payments under a Blue Box revenue program with β = 0.95, the highest β 
possible given the constraints. As there are no product-specific limits in the Blue Box, the 
Blue Box revenue program need only meet the overall Blue Box limit. As with the 
Amber Box comparison, the Blue Box comparison between the current programs and the 
proposed revenue programs shows substantial differences. The Blue Box revenue 
program would pay out every year, whereas the CCP program would pay out in 17 of the 
25 years. Also, the CCP program is based on 85 percent of the current base acreage and 
yields. The Blue Box revenue program is based on 100 percent of an updated base 
 TABLE 11. Amber Box revenue support 
Year Wheat Oats Rice Cotton Corn Sorghum Peanut Soybean Barley Total 
 ($ million) 
1980 115 8 0 337 208 28 40 42 7 786 
1981 121 0 0 273 19 5 0 15 0 434 
1982 40 1 0 197 5 0 0 29 0 273 
1983 13 0 1 221 363 24 4 52 0 678 
1984 59 3 1 111 40 27 0 246 6 492 
1985 286 8 37 152 36 15 1 89 19 643 
1986 927 8 264 536 3,058 104 4 194 26 5,122 
1987 482 1 2 31 317 26 0 20 10 888 
1988 287 9 31 203 1,909 14 0 143 34 2,630 
1989 326 12 2 123 305 65 1 136 13 981 
1990 448 15 76 76 114 26 7 48 4 815 
1991 460 19 2 176 627 34 1 136 1 1,456 
1992 198 2 185 243 438 13 1 92 5 1,176 
1993 224 11 3 394 1,544 12 10 309 3 2,510 
1994 120 12 24 9 31 6 0 2 3 207 
1995 68 2 0 116 5 2 1 22 0 214 
1996 133 2 0 43 36 14 0 3 0 231 
1997 122 1 0 30 54 2 0 4 0 214 
1998 355 17 0 336 895 62 0 220 1 1,887 
1999 570 16 259 833 1,866 54 2 663 2 4,266 
2000 485 15 267 704 1,625 67 17 559 3 3,743 
2001 407 4 270 894 912 45 1 566 4 3,103 
2002 272 7 270 785 816 77 77 291 4 2,598 
2003 70 3 0 124 133 65 11 70 1 476 
2004 103 4 1 262 241 52 10 149 0 822 
           
Limit 670 27 607 2,071 2,194 81 364 3,358 42 6,600 
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TABLE 12. Blue Box revenue support 
Year Wheat Oats Rice Cotton Corn Sorghum Peanut Soybean Barley Total 
 ($ million) 
1980 127 8 0 322 253 29 41 69 10 858 
1981 150 0 0 374 59 9 0 54 0 646 
1982 139 3 53 222 24 3 0 54 0 490 
1983 32 1 13 313 456 34 7 91 0 948 
1984 104 3 18 224 90 42 0 403 7 893 
1985 329 8 145 219 141 37 6 286 24 1,194 
1986 758 14 176 503 2,608 92 5 494 38 4,689 
1987 657 2 45 53 1,055 52 1 50 19 1,933 
1988 246 8 129 325 1,799 22 0 306 26 2,861 
1989 363 11 25 201 452 63 3 286 13 1,419 
1990 602 20 155 116 342 41 10 106 6 1,396 
1991 550 22 34 275 1,021 37 3 263 5 2,210 
1992 294 5 178 325 792 29 1 173 9 1,806 
1993 288 12 65 355 1,430 19 14 340 7 2,528 
1994 215 17 147 32 93 12 1 16 6 540 
1995 118 4 0 217 24 4 4 57 0 428 
1996 150 2 0 63 75 14 1 4 1 310 
1997 203 3 0 105 278 7 0 10 2 609 
1998 496 21 12 346 1,862 59 0 440 5 3,242 
1999 620 22 180 582 2,455 70 6 1,011 7 4,953 
2000 658 21 180 578 2,327 73 20 1,051 6 4,914 
2001 588 5 180 596 2,014 54 2 1,218 7 4,664 
2002 375 6 180 593 1,028 67 77 410 4 2,740 
2003 126 5 9 222 253 60 31 146 2 854 
2004 165 6 30 435 904 61 36 268 0 1,906 
           
Limit          5,000 
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acreage (2004 planted acreage) and yields (expected county yields). And finally, the CCP 
program is a program that pays on a national scale; all producers qualify for a CCP 
payment at the same time. The Blue Box revenue program is a county-level program; 
only producers for which actual county revenue falls below the revenue guarantee qualify 
for a payment. 
Table 13 shows the prices covered under the revenue programs when the yield 
coverage is set to 100 percent. The Amber Box revenue program can protect a slightly 
higher price (α*Effective Target Price) than the adjusted loan rate shown in Table 4. The 
Blue Box covered price (β*Effective Target Price) is 5 percent below the effective target 
price (the target price less the direct payment rate) for the current CCP program. Again, 
the revenue program can protect a higher price than the effective target price for the CCP 
program after being adjusted to meet the WTO limits. 
Another way to compare the two approaches is to examine the payment streams 
under each. Figures 3 and 4 show the total payments under the current programs and the 
proposed revenue programs, respectively. The current programs have a much more 
variable payment stream. In fact, the coefficient of variation (the ratio of the standard 
deviation to the mean) is nearly twice as high under the current programs as it is for the 
revenue programs. The LDP and CCP programs would not pay anything in several of the  
 
TABLE 13. Supported prices under the revenue programs with α = 0.85 and β = 0.95 
Crop Units 
α*Effective  
Target Price 
β*Effective  
Target Price 
Barley ($/bushel) 1.70 1.90 
Corn ($/bushel) 2.00 2.23 
Cotton ($/pound) 0.5587 0.6244 
Oats ($/bushel) 1.20 1.35 
Peanuts ($/pound) 0.1951 0.2180 
Rice ($/hundredweight) 6.93 7.74 
Sorghum ($/bushel) 1.89 2.11 
Soybeans ($/bushel) 4.56 5.09 
Wheat ($/bushel) 2.89 3.23 
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FIGURE 3. Payment stream under the current LDP and CCP programs with 
adjusted target price and loan rates to meet U.S. proposal limits 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4. Payment stream under the proposed revenue programs 
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years but would pay over $10 billion twice (1986 and 1999). The revenue programs pay 
out every year, with a low of $541 million in 1996 and a high of $9.81 billion in 1986. 
The revenue programs also have the added advantage of providing a higher level of  
average payments, $3.43 billion versus $2.80 billion for the LDP and CCP programs. So 
the revenue programs provide larger average payments while at the same time providing 
more stable payments. This would allow the United States more confidence in meeting its 
WTO obligations while also giving agricultural producers a greater amount of support. 
 
Conclusions 
Critics of the new U.S. proposal to the WTO are correct when they argue that 
adoption of the proposal would significantly reduce the degree of support that could be 
given to farmers under the current program structure. Using historical prices and yields 
from 1980 to 2004, we estimate that loan rates would have to drop by 9 percent and target 
prices would have to drop by 10 percent in order to meet the U.S. proposed aggregate 
limits. The loan rates would have to drop even more for some crops to meet the proposed 
crop-specific limits. If we had conducted the analysis using a forward-looking 
perspective, then we would have come up with different point estimates of the impact, 
but our overall conclusion that the U.S. proposal would significantly affect current U.S. 
farm programs would not change. This conclusion gives support to those who think that 
reform of U.S. farm programs is long overdue. But it also creates concern among those 
who want to maintain a strong safety net for U.S. agriculture. 
One solution to the dilemma about needing to reform U.S. farm programs to move 
the WTO negotiations forward while simultaneously providing a strong U.S. safety net 
for farmers is to redesign U.S. farm programs so that they target revenue rather than 
price. We estimate that, building on a base of 70 percent Green Box income insurance at 
the individual farm level, a farm program that provides every producer of program crops 
a revenue guarantee equal to 95 percent of the product of expected county yield (trend 
yield) and current effective target price would fit into the WTO limits as proposed by the 
United States. Payments would be triggered whenever the product of the season-average 
price and county-average yield fell below this 95 percent revenue guarantee.  
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Moving from programs that target price to ones that target revenue would have a 
number of other impacts. The first is that any rationale for ad hoc disaster payments 
would no longer exist. Farm program payments would automatically be triggered 
whenever there were significant crop losses or whenever there were significant economic 
losses caused by low output prices. (Neither a revenue target nor the current programs 
would cover significant economic losses caused by high production costs.) Second, much 
of the need for the complicated mechanism (the Standard Reinsurance Agreement) that 
transfers most risk of the U.S. crop insurance to the federal government would be 
eliminated because the federal government would directly assume the risk under farm 
programs. The risk from insuring non-program crops would remain, so some risk transfer 
mechanism would be needed. In addition, the role of the crop insurance program in 
providing a safety net for farmers would change. Conceivably, crop insurance companies 
could underwrite the 70 percent Green Box guarantees. In addition, supplementary 
insurance coverage could be offered by insurance companies, such as is currently done 
with hail coverage. 
We are under no illusion that changing the focus of federal farm programs from 
targeting price to targeting revenue would be easy. Farmers have learned to rely on price 
supports and they have learned how to extract maximum advantage of the rules 
governing the marketing loan program. Furthermore, farmers have learned that crop 
losses are often adequately covered by heavily subsidized crop insurance or by ad hoc 
disaster payments. So farmers know that the current system protects them against low 
prices and low yields. Why then move to a system that protects revenue directly? Of 
course, the only answer to this is that farmers will not move unless they see that the 
current system is untenable in an era of tight federal budgets and WTO limits.  
  
Endnotes 
1. Letter from Senator Chambliss to Agriculture Secretary Johanns, dated October 9, 
2005, accessed at http://agriculture.senate.gov/wtosc_usda.pdf, October 31, 2005. 
2. Comment accessed at http://www.cropchoice.com/leadstryagissues101405.html. 
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